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Successful human social interactions depend upon the transmission of verbal and non-verbal signals from one individual to another. Non-verbal social
communication is realized through our ability to read and understand information present in other peoples actions. It has been proposed that employing
the same motor programs, we use to execute an action when observing the same action underlies this action understanding. The main prediction of this
framework is that action perception should be strongly correlated with parameters of action execution. Here, we demonstrate that subjects sensitivity
to observed movement speeds is dependent upon how quickly they themselves executed the observed action. This result is consistent with the motor
theory of social cognition and suggests that failures in non-verbal social interactions between individuals may in part result from differences in how
those individuals move.
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INTRODUCTION
There is now substantial evidence that cortical regions known to be
important in encoding parameters of executed actions are also
active when observing another person performing the same action. It
has been proposed that this activity is important for non-verbal so-
cial communication (James, 1890; Jeannerod, 1994; Prinz, 1997;
Blaffer-Hrdy, 2009; Frith and Frith, 2012). The most well known
example of this is mirror neurons (Kilner and Lemon, 2013). Mirror
neurons were first described in the rostral division of the ventral pre-
motor cortex (area F5; di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996)
and have subsequently been reported in the inferior parietal lobule
(Fogassi et al., 2005) dorsal premotor cortex (Dushanova and
Donoghue, 2010) and primary motor cortex (Vigneswaran et al.,
2013). Mirror neurons are a class of neuron that modulate their
activity both when an individual executes a specific motor act and
when they observe the same or similar act performed by another in-
dividual. These findings in macaque monkeys are supported by a large
number of human neuroimaging studies that provide evidence for
a remarkable overlap between brain regions recruited during action
execution and action observation (Gre`zes and Decety, 2001; Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004; Caspers et al., 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012
for reviews).
Ever since their discovery, it has been proposed that mirror-
neurons, and motor system activity during action observation more
generally, underlie our ability to ‘understand’ actions (Gallese et al.,
1996; Fogassi et al., 2005). However, despite decades of research there
is still much debate about this proposed role of the motor-system in
action perception and inference (Hickok, 2009; Gallese et al., 2011).
This is of particular interest as all major theoretical accounts of the role
of the motor system in action perception and inference predict a tight
link between neural activity in the motor-system during action obser-
vation and our ability to execute the same action (Wolpert et al., 2003;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Kilner et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2011).
The key concept in all these theoretical models is that the same motor
models employed during action execution serve as the basis for per-
ception and inference during action observation. Previous research has
provided some evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. For
example, it has been demonstrated that gross deficits in action
production resulting from either cortical lesions and/or apraxia are
correlated with deficits in both action recognition and imitation
(Buxbaum et al., 2005; Negri et al., 2007; Tessari et al., 2007;
Pazzaglia et al., 2008). All these studies correlated differences in
action perception with gross errors in action production, as scored
by an expert observer. However, the proposed theoretical models
make a much more specific prediction. According to the theoretical
framework, the more similar two people execute the same action the
more effective their ability to read and predict each other’s actions will
be. In other words, differences in action inference between individuals
should be correlated with subtle differences in the kinematics of how
individuals execute the action they are observing. Here, we tested
this prediction. The aim of this study was to test whether between
subject differences in the parameters of the kinematics of an executed
action correlated with differences in action perception when observing
the same action. To this end, we deliberately tried to maximize
between subject variance in the kinematics of a simple reach and
grasp action by testing a heterogeneous population of individuals
that included healthy subjects of different ages, as well as different
movement disorder patients. We demonstrate that subject’s sensitivity
to observed actions is indeed dependent upon how they themselves
executed the observed action.
METHODS
Seventy-two subjects were recruited for the study, 16 young healthy
adults, 25 movement disorder patients, 15 functional movement
disorder (FMD) patients and 16 age matched controls. Three move-
ment disorder patients had difficulties performing the task successfully
and were excluded from further analyses, leaving a total of 69 subjects
with 22 movement disorder patients (Tables 1–4). All subjects gave
signed consent and the study was approved by a local ethical
committee.
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The patients were diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease (PD), FMDs
(phenotypes tremor or dystonia) or organic movement disorders (dys-
tonia and dystonic tremor) as follows.
The patients classified as affected by PD fulfilled the United
Kingdom Queen Square Brain Bank diagnostic criteria (Hughes,
et al., 1992).
Primary dystonia is a condition characterized by abnormal postures
in the limb. These patients were classified as affected by focal or seg-
mental dystonia following the new guidelines by Albanese et al. (2013).
The FMDs involved in this study had either a functional tremor
(FT) or functional dystonia (FD). Patient with FT present most fre-
quently with tremors of the hands and arms, but tremor of the head,
legs and palate can also occur. Peculiarly, it is present at rest, posture
and on action. It is characterized by constant variability in amplitude
and frequency, clear distractibility with clinical maneuvers and entrain-
ment with movement of other limb (especially ballistic movements).
Furthermore, it paradoxically worsens with loading.
FD is the second most common presentation in patients with FMDs.
The typical presentation is with fixed abnormal postures at rest,
rather than the typical mobile postures of organic dystonia, showing
an unusual distribution of dystonia given the age at onset. The usual
precipitating factor is a minor peripheral trauma, and term of ‘caus-
algia-dystonia’ was coined to classify this group (Bhatia et al., 1993).
Important features of FD are the absence of task or position specificity,
the absence of sensory geste and poor response to botulinum toxin.
The patients were classified as affected by FMDs following the formal
diagnostic criteria by Fahn and Williams (1988), recently revised by
Gupta and Lang (2009).
(a) The observation task
The task is identical to one previously employed (Patel et al., 2012). In
brief, subjects were asked to watch a series of video clips showing the
hand movements of two anonymized actors (one male and one
female). The videos showed the actors performing a visual discrimin-
ation task. Here, we provide details of the task that the actors
performed. It is important to note that the subjects in this study did
not have any knowledge of the task that the actors performed. In this
Table 3 Clinical profiles for patients tested in the study
Subject number Gender Age Left/right handed Diagnosis
1 Male 71 Right IFD
2 Female 61 Right ISD
3 Female 66 Right PD
4 Female 77 Right ISD
5 Female 41 Left ISD
6 Male 59 Right PD
7 Male 60 Right DT
8 Female 65 Right DT
9 Female 74 Right ISD
10 Female 69 Right PD
11 Female 69 Right ISD
12 Female 61 Right PD
13 Female 66 Right IFD
14 Female 33 Right ISD
15 Male 70 Right PD
16 Female 69 Right ISD
16 Female 45 Right PD
18 Female 42 Right ISD
19 Male 70 Left PD
20 Male 58 Right PD
21 Female 50 Right ISD
22 Female 53 Left IFD
PD, Parkinson’s disease; DT, Dystonic tremor; IFD, Idiopathic focal dystonia; ISD, Idiopathic segmental
dystonia.
Table 1 Individual profiles for young healthy subjects tested in the
study
Subject number Gender Age Left/right handed
1 Female 24 Right
2 Female 33 Right
3 Male 33 Right
4 Male 30 Right
5 Male 35 Right
6 Male 30 Right
7 Female 24 Right
8 Female 32 Right
9 Female 30 Right
10 Male 21 Right
11 Female 30 Right
12 Male 37 Right
13 Male 34 Right
14 Female 27 Right
15 Male 32 Right
16 Female 30 Right
Table 2 Individual profiles for age-matched healthy subjects tested in
the study
Subject number Gender Age Left/right handed
1 Female 73 Right
2 Female 68 Right
3 Male 70 Right
4 Female 64 Right
5 Female 55 Right
6 Female 63 Right
7 Female 38 Right
8 Male 73 Right
9 Female 65 Right
10 Male 55 Right
11 Female 48 Right
12 Female 48 Right
13 Male 53 Right
14 Female 69 Right
15 Female 68 Right
16 Female 71 Right
Table 4 Clinical profiles for patients with FMDs in the upper limbs tested in the study
Subject number Gender Age Left/right handed Diagnosis
1 Male 61 Right FT
2 Male 48 Right FD
3 Female 53 Right FT
4 Male 53 Right FT
5 Female 30 Right FD
6 Female 43 Right FT
7 Male 45 Right FD
8 Female 66 Right FT
9 Female 53 Right FT
10 Male 39 Right FT
11 Female 19 Right FD
12 Female 58 Right FT
13 Female 46 Right FT
14 Male 58 Right FD
15 Male 63 Left FT
FT, Functional tremor; FD, Functional dystonia.
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task, the actors were shown two images in swift succession on a com-
puter screen. Each image consisted of six Gabor gratings (circular
patches of smoothly varying light and dark bars) arranged around a
central fixation point. The background was a uniform grey screen of
luminance 3.66 cdm2 (see electronic Supplementary Material, Figure
S1a). In one of the two images, all of the Gabor gratings were set at the
same contrast (‘baseline Gabors’), but in the other image, one of
the Gabors was set to be a higher contrast than the other five ‘baseline’
Gabors, and appeared as a ‘pop-out’. ‘Baseline’ Gabors were displayed
at a contrast of 20% (where 0% was not a visible difference between the
light and dark grating bars and 100% is the maximum difference).
The ‘pop-out’ Gabors varied in contrast between 23 and 80%, in
increments of 3%. The appearance of the ‘pop-out’ Gabor in either
the first or second image, its contrast and its spatial position (orien-
tation around the central point) in each trial varied randomly through-
out the experiment.
After presentation of the two images, the actor was required to make
a decision as to which image (first or second) they believed contained
the ‘pop-out’. After each decision, actors were asked to rate their
confidence on a scale of 1-6 (1 denoting lowest possible confidence).
The actors were required to express their choice by using their dom-
inant hand on a custom-made response board (Supplementary Figure
S1b). The board comprised four separate sensors: a sensor on which
the hand rested between each trial, a sensor on which a marble was
placed, and two sensors, each within holes equidistant from the resting
position of the marble that sensed when the marble was placed into the
hole. After the presentation of the two images a grey screen appeared
with the numbers ‘1’ and ‘2’. To convey their forced decision as
to which image contained the ‘pop out’ Gabor, the actor was required
to move the marble from its rest position in the centre of the board
and place it on either the left or right hole, corresponding to the first or
second image, respectively. Actors were given no instruction as to how
fast or slow to move the marble. Depending on where the marble was
placed (after the marble and hand are returned to their original rest
positions on the board), a red square frame appeared around either ‘1’
or ‘2’ on the computer screen to highlight the participant’s decision.
Following this, an additional grey screen with the numbers ‘1’-‘6’
appeared, requiring the participant to rate their confidence in the de-
cision they have just made on a scale of 1-6 (1 being least confident).
This rating was expressed using the numerical keys of the QWERTY
keypad on the laptop using their non-dominant hand (i.e. the hand
that is not placed on the sensor), and subsequently a red square frame
appeared around the selected rating.
The contrast of the ‘pop-out’ Gabor was adjusted throughout the
experiment using a two-up, one-down staircase procedure such that all
participants converged onto a final score of 71% correct (correct
referring to making the right decision as to which of the two images
contained the pop-out). The staircase operated such that after two
consecutive correct decisions the contrast was decreased by one step,
whereas after one incorrect decision the contrast was increased by one
step. This was done to ensure that the analysis of movement time (MT)
and confidence was not affected by performance. It also helped one to
ensure that actors used the full extent of the confidence scale.
All movements of the actors in every trial were videoed, and these
videos were edited for presentation to the subjects in this experiment.
All video clips were edited to start 300 ms prior to onset of the move-
ment and ended once the decision had been made. In this way, we
produced 390 unique videos that showed only the right hand of the
actor reaching and grasping a marble and moving it to one of the two
decision holes from a third person perspective. In addition, this dataset
also included the 390 confidence ratings of the actors in their decision.
In this study, all subjects observed the 390 videos in a randomized
order. After watching each video clip, subjects were asked to rate how
confident they felt the actor in the video was in their decision. They
did this using the numerical keys 1-6 of the QWERTY keypad on the
laptop using their non-dominant hand, where 1 was least confident.
No feedback was given for this task. The experiment consisted of 390
trials that were presented in a random order. Subjects performed
three blocks of 100 trials and one block of 90 trials, with an interval
between each.
(b) Execution condition
To measure, how each subject executed the action, we asked each
subject to make 10 movements to reach and grasp the marble and
move it to the left hole and 10 movements to the right hole. No
instruction was given as to the speed subjects should move. Here,
for each trial we calculated the time from movement onset to the
time that the marble was placed in the left and right hole. As
the distance was travelled was constant, we used MT as an estimate
of movement speed.
(c) The visual control condition
In the visual control condition subjects observed a series of videos that
showed a dot moving from left to right across the screen. At some fixed
point the dot disappeared behind an occluder. The subjects’ task was
to the press the space bar when they thought the dot would reappear.
The dot never reappeared and no feedback was given as to the accuracy
of the response. Twenty-five different movement speeds were tested
that overlapped with the movement speeds of the observed actions.
Subjects completed two blocks of 25 trials. All trials where the esti-
mated time of reappearance differed from the actual time by greater or
1000 ms were treated as outliers and were not included in further
analyses. The aim of the visual control condition was to test whether
subjects could perceive different movement speeds. To test this,
we correlated the estimated time of reappearance with the actual
time of reappearance. If subjects could perceive different movement
speeds then the estimated and actual reappearance times would be
linearly correlated.
ANALYSIS
To test for modulations in inferred confidence with movement speed
the 390 observed videos were sorted by movement speed from
the fastest to the slowest. The mean inferred confidence was then
calculated for consecutive 39 sorted videos producing 10 mean move-
ment speeds and mean inferred confidence levels for each subject. To
test for sensitivity to the observed movement speed, we calculated the
change in confidence with observed movement speed by calculating
the slope between these two measures. This was performed initially
across all observed videos and subsequently over only the fastest half
of the videos.
RESULTS
Previous research has demonstrated that subjects are able to correctly
infer the subjective confidence of another person simply from the
kinematics of their observed action, with faster actions being perceived
as more confident (Patel et al., 2012). Here, we tested with 69 subjects
whether people’s sensitivity to the observed movement speed is
dependent upon how they themselves executed the observed action.
To increase variance in execution speed across the population, we
tested four different groups of subjects (Tables 1–4), 16 young healthy
subjects [mean age 30.1 (þ/ 4.4) years], 22 movement disorder
patients [mean age 60.4 (þ/ 11.8) years], 15 FMD patients
[mean age 49.4 þ/ 12.4] and 16 age matched healthy controls
[61.1 (þ/ 10.6) years]. All 69 subjects modulated their estimate of
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the actors’ confidence level by the speed of the observed action, with
faster actions being rated as more confident [Figure 1a; main effect of
time F(9585)¼ 251.1, P< 0.05]. All subjects showed a negative rela-
tionship between observed movement speed and inferred confidence.
This relationship was significant in 67/69 subjects (P< 0.05).
Importantly, the nature of the relationship between observed MT
and inferred confidence was significantly modulated by subject
group [Interaction between observed MT and group F(27
585)¼ 2.59, P<0.05]. There was no significant main effect of subject
group [F(3,65)¼ 0.78, P¼ 0.5].
To investigate, this effect further, we calculated the sensitivity of
each subject to the observed movement speed of the actor. As inferred
confidence decreased with decreasing observed movement speed
(increasing observed MT), we estimated subjects sensitivity to the
observed movement speed by calculating the slope between the
observed movement speed and inferred confidence. The logic being
that subjects that could not observe any difference in the observed
movement speeds should have no difference in their level of inferred
confidence. Over all observed movements the movement disorder pa-
tients and the FMD patients showed a lower sensitivity (flatter gradi-
ent) to the observed movements speeds than young healthy controls
[Figure 1b; t(36)¼3.11, P< 0.05 and t(29)¼2.87, P< 0.05,
respectively]. There was no significant difference in sensitivity between
the movement disorder patients and the healthy age-matched controls
[t(36)¼0.59, P¼ 0.56], and there was a trend to significance
between young healthy controls and age-matched controls
[t(30)¼2.03, P¼ 0.051].
The aim of this study was to test if any difference in sensitivity
between subjects could be accounted for by differences in how the sub-
jects executed the observed action. To test this end, we asked all
subjects to perform the reach and grasp action and calculated their
average movement speed. As expected, young healthy subjects
executed the actions faster than both the movement disorder patients
and the FMD patients [Figure 1c, t(36)¼4.15, P<0.05
and t(29)¼2.52, P<0.05, respectively]. In addition, there was a
trend to significance between the movement disorder patients and
the age-matched controls [t(36)¼1.93, P¼ 0.06] and between
young healthy controls and age-matched controls [t(30)¼2.01,
P¼ 0.053]. No other contrasts showed evidence of a significant differ-
ence or trend to significance.
To test any relationship between executed movement speed and
sensitivity to observed movement speed, we correlated the two meas-
ures. There was no significant relationship found between the two
measures (R2¼ 0.045, P¼ 0.07; Figure 1d). However, this initial ana-
lysis assumed that the sensitivity of the observer to the observed MTs
would be the same across all observed MTs. This is in distinction to the
predictions of the theoretical work where the observer should be least
sensitive when movement speeds were most different to the speed the
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Fig. 1 Through the whole figure blue shows data from the young healthy controls, red the movement disorder patients and green the age matched healthy controls. (a) shows the relationship between
observed movement speed and relative change in inferred confidence. The black dots show the actual confidence of the person being observed and the grey line shows the linear fit of this data. Note that the
data for each subject was mean corrected prior to averaging. (b) show the average sensitivity to the observed movement speed for the different groups. (c) shows the average movement speed of the subjects
during action execution. (d) show the correlation of the execution time against observed movement sensitivity for all subjects. The black line shows that the results of a linear regression between these two
variables. All error bars are standard errors of the mean. *, indicate significant differences at P< 0.05.
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observer would execute the action. To test this, we calculated the sen-
sitivity of the observer to the fastest half of the observed movement
speeds (grey box Figure 1a). For the fastest observed movements there
was a significant difference in mean sensitivity to the observed MTs
between healthy young adults and movement disorder patients [Figure
2a; t(36)¼3.1, P< 0.05], between FMD patients and healthy young
controls [t(29)¼3.4, P<0.05] and between healthy young controls
and age-matched controls [t(30)¼2.07, P<0.05]. There were no
significant differences between any of the other contrasts. To test for
the relationship between sensitivity to observed MTs and executed
MTs, we correlated the two measures. When inferring on the fastest
50% of the observed movements there was a significant correlation
between sensitivity and executed movement speed [Figure 2b, para-
metric R2¼ 0.14, P< 0.05; non-parametric R2¼ 0.15, P< 0.05]. Thus,
as predicted sensitivity to observed movement speed was correlated
with execution speed across subjects.
To rule out this result being explained by modulations with other
correlated factors, subjects age and overall estimated mean confidence
level, we performed a stepwise regression to explain sensitivity to
observed movement speed with execution speed, subjects age and sub-
ject mean estimated confidence in the model. Of these three factors
subjects’ execution speed explained the most variance in the sensitivity
to the observed movement speed and the final model from this step-
wise regression included the subjects’ movement speed and the mean
estimated confidence level in the final model (R2¼ 0.28, P< 0.05). The
final model excluded subjects’ age as not explaining sufficient extra
variance to be included.
Here, we have demonstrated a significant relationship between sub-
jects’ sensitivity to observed movement speed and their own movement
speed during action execution. To test whether this was a general lack
of sensitivity to movement speed or was more specific to observing
human movements we asked subjects to perform a control condition.
Here, subjects observed a dot moving with constant velocity from left
to right across the screen. After a certain time the dot disappeared
behind a screen. The subjects’ task was to press a button when they
thought the dot would reappear from behind the screen. The range of
dot speeds was chosen to overlap the observed mean movement
speeds. To estimate whether subjects correctly perceived the dot
speed, we correlated the estimated time of reappearance with the
actual time the dot would have reappeared. If subjects could correctly
perceive and estimate the dot speed these two measures should be
linearly related across different dot velocities and the gradient should
be close to unity. There were no significant differences in the gradients
between these two measures across the different subject groups.
[Young adults vs movement patients t(27)¼ 0.36, P¼ 0.72, young
healthy adults vs age matched controls t(30)¼ 0.56, P¼ 0.58;
movement disorder patients vs age matched controls t(27)¼ 0.15,
P¼ 0.88; FMD patients vs young healthy adults t(29)¼ 0.46, P¼ 0.65;
FMD patients vs age matched controls t(29)¼0.07, P¼ 0.94; FMD
patients vs movement disorder patients t(26)¼ 0.07, P¼ 0.94; Figure
2c and d].
To show the dissociation between inferring on movement speeds in
the control task and the movement speeds when observing actions, we
tested whether there was an interaction between subjects’ sensitivity to
observed action and to the dot movements and the subject group.
To this end, we first normalized the data for the two tasks as the
two tasks had different measures of sensitivity. For each task
the data were normalized such that that mean was equal to zero and
the standard deviation equal to one. Importantly, there was a signifi-
cant interaction between the measure of sensitivity for observed
human movements and dot movements and subjects group
[F(3,56)¼ 3.18, P¼ 0.031, Figure 2e]. The interaction was driven by
a more negative gradient (increased sensitivity; Figure 1a and b) for the
young healthy controls when inferring on the videos of another human
compared with other groups. There were no significant main effects
[main effect of group F(3,56)¼ 1.15, P¼ 0.34; main effect of task
F(1,56)¼ 0.007, P¼ 0.93].
DISCUSSION
There is a lack of agreement as to the functional role, if any, of activity
in the motor-system during action-observation (Hickok, 2009; Gallese
et al., 2011). The discovery of mirror neurons in ventral premotor
cortex and the extensive overlap in regions of the motor system
active during both action observation and action execution in
humans has led many to assert that we require our motor systems to
‘understand’ observed actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al.,
1996; Gallese et al., 2011). The main prediction of this action ‘under-
standing’ functional framework is that the sensitivity of a subject
to correctly perceive information present in an observed action
should be strongly correlated with how the subject executes the same
action. Here, we have shown precisely this. Moreover, we have demon-
strated that this difference in inference is not due to a general deficit
in perceiving movement speed but was specific to observing human
biological actions.
Here, we have tested both healthy control subjects, patients with
organic movement disorders, including PD, dystonia and tremor
patients, and patients with FMDs. The reason for using movement
disorder patients was to increase the variance in the movement execu-
tion times across the population of subjects. Indeed, we found no
evidence that the different patient groups performed any differently
and indeed many of the patients showed no difference in their execu-
tion times from age-matched healthy controls (Figure 2b). Even those
patients that did perform slower were not severely impaired in this
task. It is important to stress that here the aim was not to have carefully
controlled patient groups but rather we deliberately choose a hetero-
geneous population of subjects so as to increase movement speed vari-
ance between subjects. For example, here we did not control for, or
assess, the cognitive capabilities of the subjects and we did not control
for time from illness or the therapy the patients had undergone. These
factors would typically be controlled in any patient study to ensure that
any between group differences could not be confounded by of any of
these less interesting factors. There are a number of reasons why these
patient measures could not explain our data. Here, we show a correl-
ation across all subjects, irrespective of their health or disorder.
Therefore, by maximizing the variance in the subject population we
also minimize the chance that any result is due to a confound that
occurs in just one of the patient groups. For example, there were only
eight PD patients out of 69 subjects. Therefore, it is unlikely that any
differences in medication or cognitive decline in this group would
confound the correlation result across all 69 subjects. The other critical
part of the study is that there was a significant interaction in the sub-
jects’ ability to infer simple movement speed and perceive confidence
from an observed action. In other words, all subjects could accurately
perceive motion and velocity, but they differed in how they inferred
information present in an observed action in a manner that was cor-
related with their own movement speed.
Previous studies of action-observation have focused on the
functional role of the motor-system, specifically mirror neurons, in
inferring the goal or intention of the action (di Pellegrino et al.,
1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Umilta et al., 2001). This is in distinction
to the study described here in which we demonstrate a dependency
between the kinematics of an executed action and subjects’ ability
to ‘read’ information present in the kinematics of an observed
action. However, these differences in the level of inference are not
incompatible. Actions can be described at multiple levels and
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Fig. 2 Through the whole figure blue shows data from the young healthy controls, red the movement disorder patients and green the age matched healthy controls. (a) show the average sensitivity to the
observed movement speed for the different groups. (b) shows the correlation of the execution time against observed movement sensitivity for all subjects. The black line shows that the results of a linear
regression between these two variables (c) show the correlation of estimated time of dot reappearance and actual time of dot reappearance for all three groups. (d) shows the average slope of the regression
between actual time of reappearance and estimated time of reappearance for each subject in the different groups. (e) shows the average sensitivity to the observed movement speed and the observed
movement speed for the different groups. Note that this data has been normalized prior o plotting such that the mean was equal to one and the standard deviation equal to one. All error bars are standard
errors of the mean. *, indicate significant differences at P< 0.05.
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therefore there are multiple levels at which information about an
observed action can be inferred. For example, actions can be described
at least four levels: (i) the kinematic level: the trajectory and the vel-
ocity profile of the action, including both the reach and grasp phase of
a goal directed action; (ii) the motor level: the processing and pattern
of muscle activity required to produce the kinematics; (iii) the goal
level: the immediate purpose of the action, for example to grasp an
object and (iv) the intention level: the overall reason for executing the
action. These levels are clearly non-independent and can be organized
hierarchically, with the kinematics being dependent on the motor level,
the motor level being dependent on the goal level and the goal level
being dependent on the intention level. As one moves up the hierarchy,
the action is described in more and more abstract terms. Although, this
hierarchical organization enables inference at different levels any in-
ferences must be based on the exteroceptive information of how the
hand and arm move through space, as this is the only information the
observer receives during action observation. In other words, whatever
level an inference is made on an observed action, be it an inference on
the goal or intention of the action or be it an inference on the
emotional state of the observed person, whether they are anxious or
confident, it is dependent upon the kinematics of the observed action.
Indeed, recent theoretical predictive coding accounts of motor system
activity during action observation (Kilner et al., 2007; Friston et al.,
2011; Kilner, 2011), propose that the role of the motor system during
action observation is to generate a prediction of the kinematics of the
observed action. Indeed, previous research has highlighted the import-
ance of kinematics in action perception both in healthy controls
(Daprati et al., 2007) and in patients (Castiello et al., 2009).
Although the results presented here are consistent with such theoretical
account, it is important to note that we present no data that shows that
the dependency between action execution and action inference demon-
strated here is a result of activity in the motor system and this will form
the basis of future studies.
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